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I. INTRODUCTION
Sales and use taxes have been the great growth taxes of state
and local governments during the past half century. The general
sales tax, along with selected levies on gasoline, tobacco, and li-
quor, has had phenomenal growth during the past fifty years. In
1932 only Mississippi imposed a general sales tax.1 It produced
seven million dollars, less than one percent of Mississippi's total
tax revenues.2 Taxes once introduced, however, tend to grow at
least until widespread dissatisfaction leads to a taxpayers' revolt,
such as California's Proposition 13' or the election of President
Ronald Reagan and the ascendancy of political conservatism and
supply side economics. The more typical tax experience, which
took place with the growth of state sales taxation, is reflected in
the history of the New York City sales tax. That tax was intro-
1. J. DuE & J. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION 2 (1983).
2. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE TAX COLLECTIONS IN 1977 Series GF - 77 No.
1.
3. See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "The Taxpayers Speak:
Proposition 13 and Intergovernmental Relations," 4 Intergovernmental Perspective No. 3,
(Summer 1978) [hereinafter cited as ACIR].
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duced into the city's tax structure during the Great Depression 4 as
an emergency measure to relieve the inhabitants of the City of
New York from the hardships and suffering caused by unemploy-
ment. The authority granted to the city by the state legislature to
impose the tax was "temporary," expiring on February 28, 1934.5
That temporary levy has now been part of the city's tax structure
for more than fifty years. In 1933 the tax rate was two percent; it is
now four and one quarter percent 6 and is imposed alongside the
state's four percent sales tax.1
At the end of 1984, in contrast to the single state that levied a
general sales tax in 1932, the tax was in full force in forty-five
states and the District of Columbia-every state except Alaska,
Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon.' General sales
and gross receipts taxes produced sixty-three billion dollars in
1984, accounting for thirty-two percent of all state taxes.9
Sales taxes also have become an important revenue source for
local governments, although property taxes always have been, and
remain today, the mainstay of local tax revenues. In 1932 sales and
gross receipts taxes were insignificant, producing only .4 percent of
local government tax revenues.10 They have burgeoned in recent
decades; in 1984 local governments levied sales taxes in thirty-one
states1 and collected eighteen billion dollars, or 14.5 percent of
their total tax revenues, from sales and gross receipts taxes. 12
I propose to examine several of the major developments in
sales taxation that have taken place during this past half century
of growth of the tax.'3
4. N.Y.C. Local Law No. 19 (1933).
5. 1933 N.Y. Laws Ch. 815.
6. ST. TAx. REP. [NY] (CCH), 8362. The / % tax over and above the 4% tax is im-
posed in the Metropolitan Commuter Tax District. Id.
7. See id. at T 97,393. All subsequent references to the CCH or Prentice-Hall State
and Local Tax Services will refer only to the State and paragraph numbers without repeat-
ing the title "State and Local Tax Service".
8. ACIR, "Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism: 1984 Edition," Table 60, at 88
(March 1985).
9. Id. Table 31, at 47, Table 33.1, at 49.
10. See generally U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATE GOVERNMENTAL FINANCES IN 1975 and
prior years.
11. See ACIR, supra note 8, Table 1, at 9, Table 62, at 94 (figures as of October 1984).
12. Id. Table 31, at 47, Table 33.3, at 51. The local tax figures include both general
and selective sales taxes. They are not broken down, as are the state tax revenues.
13. Throughout this Article, references to "sales taxation" or "sales taxes" are
designed to include use taxation and use taxes.
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II. BROADENING THE SALES TAX TO COVER A WIDER RANGE OF
SERVICES
The general sales tax began in this country essentially as a tax
on sales of tangible personal property. Real property already was
regarded as heavily overburdened by taxes. When the general sales
tax began to take hold, a new source of revenue was sought.14 In-
tangibles, such as securities, copyrights, patents, and the like, were
excluded from the levy, and in general, services were not taxed,
except for utilities and amusement admissions.15 Utility services,
particularly gas and electricity, always have been a ready target for
taxation, despite the fact that they are regressive.1 6 That is, of
course, because the poor spend a greater proportion of their in-
comes on gas and electricity for their homes than do the rich.
Tax economists long have deplored the exclusion of consumer
services other than health and, in some cases, utility services from
sales taxation.
Most advisory groups and most scholars who have examined the desirability
of including services in the sales-tax base have been in favor of doing so. The
reasons most frequently cited are (1) service inclusion alleviates regressivity
and improves neutrality; (2) inclusion makes the sales tax more income elas-
tic; (3) service inclusion can raise much revenue; and (4) inclusion is adminis-
tratively feasible. 17
Professor John Due of the University of Illinois, a leading eco-
nomic authority on sales taxation, has written:
There has been a tendency to confine sales taxes, especially of the single
stage character, to sales of commodities, that is of tangible personal property,
thus excluding the rendering of services. Most of the American state sales
taxes do not apply to any services or to only a few categories. . . . From an
economic standpoint, the distinction between a service and a commodity is
not a very significant one, since both satisfy personal wants. A haircut, an
opera concert, or a plane ride satisfy persons' desires in the same manner as a
loaf of bread, a piano, or an automobile. Obviously services rendered to busi-
ness firms, whether by employees or commercial service establishments, are
not suitable bases for a sales tax, since they are essentially producers' goods,
and do not in themselves satisfy personal wants. But the failure to include
services rendered to consumers gives rise to the same objectionable results as
the exemption of specific commodities. Persons making relatively high ex-
penditures for services are favored compared to those concentrating their
purchases on tangible goods, resource allocation may be distorted, and in
some cases administrative complications are created. This is particularly true
when services are rendered by establishments also selling commodities; the
14. See J. HELLEsTEIN AND W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LocAL TAXATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 2 (4th ed. 1978).
15. J. DUE, SALES TAXATION 297 (1957).
16. J. DUE & J. MIKEsELL, supra note 1, at 83.
17. D. MORGAN, RETAIL SALES TAX 127 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
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line of distinction between service and commodity is by no means a sharp
one, and the two may be provided jointly, particularly in the case of repair
and fabrication service. Any sale, of course, involves the rendering of some
services (that of the merchant, for example, with a retail tax); when services,
as such, are not taxed, the line of demarkation is not actually made between
commodity sale and the rendering of service, but between the type of service
regarded as typical merchandising activity and another type, which is not so
regarded. The drawing of this line of distinction is highly arbitrary, and gives
rise to a number of administrative problems. Especially with the retail sales
tax, in which the problems are most acute, so-called service establishments
encounter greater difficulty with the application of the tax than any other
type of business. The service industries require the greatest number of special
regulations and rulings, and the greatest care in inspection. 8
During the half century between the 1930s and the 1980s, tax-
ation of services under the sales tax laws has broadened greatly. By
1985 there were thirty-two states taxing gas and electricity;19 ad-
missions to movie theaters and other places of amusement were
taxed by twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia.20 Ho-
tels, motels, and other transient accommodations currently are
taxed by every sales tax state except California and Nevada, and in
those states local governments tax transient accommodations.21 In
fourteen states the taxation of services was further broadened to
18. J. DuE, supra note 15, at 374-75. Professor Due added:
Those [services] generally regarded as unsuitable for taxation on grounds of general
social policy include medical and dental service, hospitalization, education, housing,
local transportation, and other categories. For purely administrative reasons it is virtu-
ally impossible to include the work of personal servants, foreign travel, and some other
items.
'Thus there remains as suitable for taxation a range of services normally rendered
by commercial establishments, such as public utility service, admissions to places of
amusement, rentals of transient accommodations, repair work of all types, fabrication
(such as the work of a merchant tailor), dry cleaning, laundry, barber and beauty shop
work, photofinishing, pest control, etc. Building contracting can also be included. Inclu-
sion of these categories simplifies administration of the tax for the most part, elimi-
nates discrimination in favor of persons who spend relatively large percentages of their
incomes for these services, and increases the tax revenue at a given rate.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also D. MORGAN, supra note 17, at 126-27.
19. See ACIR, supra note 8, Table 60, at 88. The figures are as of January 1985. There
were a variety of exemptions and exclusions from the utility taxes in the various states. Id.
In some states telephone, telegraph, transportation, water, and other utilities were taxed.
For a detailed statement of the scope of taxation of sales by utilities, see J. DuE & J. MiKE-
SELL, supra note 1, at 83. In some states sales by utilities are taxed under special statutes
other than the general sales tax law. Id.
20. A few states tax country club dues, Nevada has a cabaret tax, and Rhode Island
applies its admissions tax to racing events with pari-mutual betting. See ACIR, supra note
8, Table 60 at 88.
21. J. DuE & J. MIKESeLL, supra note 1, at 85-86. As is true with respect to some other
services, the taxes on transient accommodations in some states are imposed by statutes
other than the state's general sales tax. Id.
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the extent that there was what the Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations (ACIR) categorized as "substantial taxa-
tion of services," which included, in one or more states, repairs,
laundry, dry cleaning, cable television, parking, landscaping, book-
keeping, and collection services." In three states the ACIR found
"broad taxation of services" under laws imposing sales taxes on the
services of investment counselors, bank service charges, beauty
parlors, barber shops, carpenters, and interior decorators .2  In
three other states-Hawaii, New Mexico, and South Da-
kota-general taxation of services obtained, including legal, ac-
counting, and other professional services, except for health
24services.
There has been strong resistance by professional organizations
to the extension of the sales tax to cover their services. The move-
ment to tax professional services has not met with much success, 25
particularly since lawyers, who dominate state legislatures, have
consistently opposed taxation of legal or other professional
services.
Restricting the scope of state and local sales taxes to specified
services, while taxing sales of tangible personal property other than
specifically excluded sales, has given rise to a great deal of
litigation.
III. PROFESSIONAL SERVICES AND TAXABLE SALES
The sales tax statutes of many states provide that "profes-
sional, insurance or other personal service transactions, which in-
volve no sale or which involve sales as inconsequential elements for
which no separate charges are made" are not taxable. 8 In point of
fact, such provisions serve little purpose, since the courts have
tended to reach essentially the same results as to professional and
personal services in states whose laws have no such explicit exemp-
tion. As a matter of tax policy, there is no good reason for exempt-
22. See ACIR, supra note 8, at 81-89. The term "substantial taxation of services" is
used by the ACIR.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. For an unsuccessful attempt to extend sales taxes to professional services,
other than medical services, see the recommendation of the N.J. Tax Policy Committee. 5
N.J. TAX POLICY COMM1TME REPORT, 68-69 (1972). The proposal was not adopted by the
state legislature. Similarly, for a discussion of the defeat of similar efforts in Conecticut, see
N.Y. Times, May 5, 1983, § B at 10.
26. MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN., ch. 64H § 1(13)(c) (West 1969); N.J. Rav. STAT. § 54:32B-
2(e)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1986).
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ing professional services, while taxing the same type of services
rendered by nonprofessionals, but that has tended to occur. Thus,
in one case, although X-rays taken by physicians were held not
taxable on the ground that they constitute services, X-rays taken
by an X-ray specialist who was not a physician were held taxable
as sales of the X-rays. In some states eye examinations performed
by an ophthalmologist, who is a licensed physician and who
prescribes and furnishes eyeglasses, constitute nontaxable profes-
sional services, whereas if the opthalmologist gives a patient a pre-
scription that is filled by an optician, who is not required to be and
is not a physician, a taxable sale of eyeglasses is deemed to have
taken place. 8 I know of no sales tax policy that justifies such a
distinction based on the professional or nonprofessional character
of the provider of services. Both types of transactions ought to be
treated equally, whether taxable or nontaxable. In some states, in-
cluding Tennessee, this result has been achieved through legisla-
tion.29 Under the Tennessee statute, the furnishing of eyeglasses by
optometrists, opticians, and opthalmologists is treated as a nontax-
able personal service.30
IV. THE LINES DRAWN BY THE COURTS BETWEEN TAXABLE SALES
AND NONTAXABLE SERVICES: THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY OVER THE
TAXATION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
In seeking to implement the statutory exemption for personal
service transactions in which sales of tangible personal property
are inconsequential, or in defining or drawing the line between
sales of tangibles or intangibles and personal services under stat-
utes lacking an explicit personal services exemption, the courts
have enunciated a series of tests or guidelines. I propose to discuss
the guidelines in the context of the current controversy in this
country as to the taxability of computer software. Just as high
technology is at the forefront of the development of modern indus-
try, so the taxability of computer software is at the forefront of
current sales tax controversy.
Computer software programs are of two broad types-the op-
erating program, which controls the hardware and makes the ma-
chine run, and the applicational program, which performs specific
27. People v. Grazer, 138 Cal. App. 2d 274, 291 P.2d 957 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
28. See, e.g., Ky. Sales Tax Regulations, 103 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 26:030.
29. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-6-316 (1983).
30. Id.
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functions, such as preparing a payroll or a loan amortization sched-
ule for use by a bank."'
A. The True Object or Dominant Purpose Test
One of the tests of sale versus service that has been developed
by the courts is the "true object" or "dominant purpose" test.
That test has been stated by the Virginia Supreme Court as
follows:
The test applied by a preponderance of the authorities from other jurisdic-
tions with sales tax statutes similar to our Virginia statutes is: if the "true
object" sought by the buyer is the services per se, the exemption is available,
but if the true object of the buyer is to obtain the property produced by the
service, the exemption is not available."2
The first computer software case to reach a state supreme
court occurred in Tennessee. In 1976 the Tennessee Supreme
Court held that furnishing computer software did not constitute a
sale of tangible personal property."3 That case involved applica-
tional software programs for preparing the payroll and loan amor-
tization schedules for a bank. Some of the programs were of stan-
dard design, and only minor modifications were necessary to fit the
bank's needs, while others were specialized and unique. Although
the information could have been programmed manually at the
bank's computer terminal by remote programming from the pro-
ducer's terminal and then transmitted to the bank by telephone,
all the bank's software programs at issue were apparently received
on punch cards, magnetic tapes, or disks. The vendors frequently
provided manuals, services, and consultation in order to instruct
the bank's employees in handling the programs.
The bank contended that "while the intellectual processes
may be embodied" in the punch cards and magnetic tapes, "the
logic or intelligence of the program is an intangible property
right," and that is what it purchased. 4 The court agreed:
[I]n the case at bar. . . no product is created. What is created and sold here
is information, and the magnetic tapes which contain this information are
only a method of transmitting these intellectual creations from the originator
to the user. It is merely incidental that these intangibles are transmitted by
way of a tangible reel of tape that is not even retained by the user.3 5
31. See Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405, 406 (Tenn. 1976).
32. WTAR Radio-TV Corp. v. Commonweath, 217 Va. 877, 883, 234 S.E.2d 245, 249
(1977).
33. Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976).
34. Id. at 407.
35. Id. The Tennessee court's approach has been characterized as the "desired end
[Vol. 39:961
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Tax administrators contend that computer software sales are
taxable, since they are no different from phonograph record and
music tape sales and motion picture film rentals, all of which are
generally held to constitute taxable sales. In rejecting that view the
Missouri Supreme Court said:
The Director argues that the Hearing Commission's decision is contrary
to Universal Images, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, because there the Court
held that motion picture film was taxable as tangible personal property at its
transaction value. The Director equates the film with the tapes in this case.
We disagree. Instead, we embrace the idea that "[t]he physical presence of
the movie film is essential to broadcasting the intangible artistic efforts of the
actors." This view is also shared by the Illinois Supreme Court which, in
holding computer software not taxable as tangible personal property, stated:
"The plaintiff bank purchased, in substance, the means of programming its
computer so that it could perform functions the bank needed to have per-
formed. The bank did not desire to spend the money or time to formulate the
programs through its own data-processing staff. Therefore, it purchased in-
struction programs from other sources. It simply happened that, for the sake
of convenience and easy handling, the programs were recorded on magnetic
tapes. The tapes were certainly not the only medium through which the in-
formation could be transferred. In this way, the tapes differ from a movie
film, a phonograph record or a book, whereby the media used are the only
practicable ways of preserving those articles. Thus, while those articles and
the tapes are similar in that they physically represent the transfer of ideas
or artistic processes, a more significant distinction is that those articles are
inseparable from the ideas or processes, whereas computer programs are
separable from the tapes." The movie film in Universal Images was pur-
chased as a finished product with the idea that the tangible film itself would
be used and reused. As noted above, the tapes in this case are not employed
in the same manner. Universal Images does not control this case.3 '
Two Justices of the court, however, dissented. They argued:
Regarding the second of the bases advanced for its holding, the majority rely-
ing on First National Bank of Springfield v. Dept. of Revenue, discussed how
the bank in that case purchased magnetic tapes to program its computer,
noting that the Illinois Court held that the "programs" contained in the tapes
were not taxable because they were "separable from the tapes". While in con-
trast, the majority opines, information contained in a "movie film" "phono-
graph record" or "book" is inseparable from the medium of transmittal. This
proposition too is flawed because the program (information) contained in a
movie film, phonograph record, book or magnetic tape is not inseparable but
rather may be readily separated or transferred to other media for subsequent
use. With phonograph records (or pre-programmed magnetic tapes), a com-
mon practice is, by use of the "tape deck," to record on magnetic tapes (cas-
sette, reel-to-reel, etc.) the program from the "wax record" (or tape), thereby
separating the artistic process, instructional material or other information
from the record (or tape) and transferring it to another medium for storage
product" test, which is essentially the same as the dominant purpose test.
36. James v. Tres Computer Services, Inc., 642 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Mo. 1982) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted) (quoting First National Bank v. Department of Rev., 421 N.E.2d
175, 178 (Ill. 1981)).
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and future use. Nevertheless the retail price of the wax record, movie film or
programmed magnetic tape is the basis for the sales or use tax, not the price
of unexposed film or a blank wax record or an unrecorded magnetic tape.
How can the same not be said of the tapes here in question?
37
In recent years some courts have expressed disagreement with
the dominant purpose test or with the conclusion that the pur-
chaser's dominant purpose was the information contained in the
programs. The Maryland Court of Appeals found that "the domi-
nant purpose" of a computer software "transaction was to obtain a
copy of the programs."38
There is, in my view, an inherent weakness in the dominant
purpose or true object test in that each of three elements is essen-
tial to the purchaser: the services that produced the product, the
information or intelligence the product contains, and the punch
cards, tape, or disk in which the product is delivered. Hence, the
elusive search for the true or dominant purpose among these ele-
ments tends to depend on the "gut" reaction of the court.
B. The Insignificance of the Materials as Compared to the
Services Going into a Product
Another test that has been used by some courts to find that a
service, rather than a sale, is involved is the inconsequentiality of
the cost or value of the materials, as compared to the services.
Thus, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
drawings of comic strips that were made into mats and printed in
newspapers were not subject to sales tax. 9 In so holding, the court
relied in part on the fact that the cost of the materials going into
the strips was inconsequential, as compared to the cost of the art-
ist's services. The strips themselves cost only ten percent of the
total price paid.40
The fallacy in this view was long ago demonstrated by the
North Dakota Supreme Court:
[T]here is no article, fabricated by a machine or fashioned by the human
hand, that is not the fruit of the exercise and application of individual ability
and skill. And few, indeed, are the instances where the greater part of the
cost thereof is not chargeable to personal service directly or remotely
applied.4'
37. Id. at 352 (Finch, J., and Rendlen, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
38. Comptroller v. Equitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 470, 464 A.2d 248, 254 (1983),
accord Chrittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 27, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983).
39. Washington Times-Herald v. District of Columbia, 213 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
40. Id. at 24.
41. Voss v. Gray, 70 N.D. 727, 734, 298 N.W. 1, 4 (1941).
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The insubstantial property component rule is inconsistent
with widely established sales tax practice. If one commissions a
highly paid artist to do a portrait, or a Parisian couturier to design
and produce an exclusive gown, frequently the price is largely paid
for the artist's or designer's work, while the canvas and paint, and
often the materials in the dress, are of comparatively inconsequen-
tial value. Similarly, subscription fees for tax and financial services
are not paid for the paper on which the information is printed, but
for the services of the editors in gathering data, analyzing
problems, and setting forth the results. Yet sales taxes generally
are imposed on such transactions, despite the comparatively small
part of the cost paid for the materials.42
C. Custom-Designed Versus Canned Software
In recent years the courts of several states have held that
software programs that are bought ready made off the shelf and
are usable by many customers are subject to sales tax, although
programs specially designed for a particular customer are not taxa-
ble. I should like to examine the validity of that distinction.
The rule that specially ordered goods, usable only by the par-
ticular purchaser, constitute a service and not a sale was developed
in the graphic arts industry early in the history of general sales
taxation. 43 The rule appears to have been derived from cases aris-
ing under the Statute of Frauds, which is usually held inapplicable
to service contracts. 44 The Statute of Frauds was designed to re-
duce fraudulent claims by requiring enforceable sales agreements
to be in written form. The courts concluded that it would be harsh
and inequitable to apply the requirement of a written contract to
specially manufactured articles, which are not suitable for sale in
the ordinary course of the seller's business.45
Such considerations have no bearing on sales taxes. Indeed,
the rule of excluding from sales tax custom-made articles in the
graphic arts industry has long since been abandoned in Illinois, the
state whose courts had been the principal exponent of the rule.46
The application of the Statute of Frauds special order rule to sales
42. See J. Hellerstein, The Scope of the Taxable Sale Under Sales and Use Tax Acts:
Sales as Distinguished from Service, 11 TAx L. REV. 261, 267-88 (1956).
43. See id. at 272.
44. See 2 WILLISTON ON SALES § 14-9 (4th ed. 1974); U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(a) (1976).
45. See Hellerstein, supra note 42, at 272.
46. See Ill. Retailers' Occupation Tax § 440 (§1), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 440 (Smith-
Hurd 1974).
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taxes produces capricious and arbitrary results. Under such a rule,
a wealthy matron who orders a specially designed semicircular
couch for the living room of her Fifth Avenue mansion-a couch
that most people could not use or afford-would pay no sales tax,
whereas a person of modest means who buys a ready-made couch
from Levitz for a typically modern small home would be subject to
the sales tax. Similarly, under the special order approach, a large
corporation that can afford to pay for specially designed computer
software that is adapted to the corporation's particular needs and
not usable by others would not pay sales tax, whereas businesses
with more moderate resources that purchase canned software
would be taxable.
D. Suggested Guidelines for Distinguishing Between Sales and
Service in Transactions in Which the Services Are Embodied in
Tangible Property: The Community Appraisal Test
If the "true object" or "dominant purpose" or "desired end"
test of sales and services or of sales of tangibles and intangibles,
the insignificant property component rule, and the custom-made
article rule are to be rejected, what guidelines should be substi-
tuted? While no test is likely to fit all situations and we must be
flexible in applying any test, the most satisfactory test that I have
found for drawing the line between sales and services under the
sales tax lies in the community appraisal of the trade, business, or
occupation as engaging in selling products or as rendering services.
The treatment of professionals under the sales tax laws is es-
sentially based on that test. Laymen do not regard their lawyers as
selling them the wills they draw, nor are dentists looked upon as
selling their patients the inlays or dentures that are painfully fitted
into their mouths. And we do not regard architects as selling the
plans they prepare for a new building. Such transactions are ac-
cepted by tax administrators and treated by the courts as service
transactions. The paper on which the will and the architect's plans
are prepared, and the gold, silver, and plastic used in making in-
lays and dentures are looked on as incidental uses of property in
furnishing services.
Likewise, the community attitude toward nonprofessional ac-
tivities that are claimed to be services also underlies sales tax deci-
sions. Thus, in the leading New York decision holding that Dun &
Bradstreet, the credit agency, was engaged in rendering services in
providing its credit reports, the court applied the community ap-
[Vol. 39:961
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praisal test.47
The ascertainment of whether people generally regard a trade,
occupation, or business as selling goods, rendering services, or li-
censing intangibles is, of course, not always easy. Computer
software is a case in point. The industry is so new, and it has de-
veloped such refinements and variety in the types of products pro-
duced and services rendered that attitudes may not yet have be-
come fixed as to whether the industry is engaged in selling
products or rendering services.
The tendency in recent years has been to tax canned but not
custom-made software. By the end of 1984 almost exactly half of
the forty-five sales tax states-twenty-three states-followed that
practice. Five states exempted both canned and custom-made
software from tax, and the remaining seventeen states, including
Tennessee,48 taxed both types of software.4 9
There are, in my view, persuasive reasons for taxing both cus-
tom-made and canned computer software programs. First, as a
matter of tax equality, if canned programs are taxed, customized
programs should not be tax free. Second, there is no good reason
for taxing phonographic records and music tapes and dramatic and
other presentations, while not taxing records, tapes, and punch
cards that embody computer software programs. Finally, there is
the overriding wisdom of the view of tax economists that, so long
as the states tax sales of tangible personal property generally, ser-
vices likewise should be taxed, except for special areas such as
medical and health services.
V. SALES AND USE TAX COLLECTION AND THE UNITARY BUSINESS
DOCTRINE
We turn now from substantive reform of the sales tax to a pro-
posed reform in tax administration. A proposal recently was made
by the then Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, Elaine K. Hoiska,
and seconded by counsel to the Multistate Tax Commission
(MTC) that the unitary business principle, developed in the corpo-
rate income tax area, may properly be applied to the duty of an
out-of-state seller to collect a state's use tax.50 The suggestion is
47. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. City of New York, 276 N.Y. 198, 204, 11 N.E.2d 728, 731
(1937).
48. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-6-102(14)(B) (1983).
49. 45 ST. TAX REV. (CCH), "State Taxation of Computer Software," (Oct. 30, 1984).
50. E. Hoiska, "Using Unitary Concepts in Nexus Investigations for Sale and Use Tax
Purposes," Multistate Tax Comm'n Annual Meeting, July, 1984, at 41; A. Friedman, Multis-
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that the in-state activities of a subsidiary that is part of a unitary
business may be attributed to its parent in determining whether
the parent company has sufficient nexus with the state to be re-
quired to collect the state's use tax on its sales to customers in the
state.
A. Constitutional Prerequisites for Imposing on a Foreign
Corporation the Duty to Collect Use Taxes
It is established law that "due process requires some
definite link, some minimum connection" with a state before an
out-of-state seller can be required to collect use taxes.5 1 The activi-
ties of an independent contractor acting as agent for the seller are
attributed to the seller in determining whether an adequate nexus
exists.52
B. The Argument Made in Support of the Application of the
Unitary Business Doctrine to Use Tax Collection
The basis for Commissioner Hoiska's position was stated by
her as follows:
Our approach is simply expanding on the Illinois Supreme Court case
wherein a subsidiary operating in-state is sufficient to make an out-of-state
parent collect on its mail order sales.
5 3
Mr. Friedman stated the MTC position as follows:
Under the unitary business principle, the activities of a parent may be
considered, if the activities of the subsidiary constitute nexus with the taxing
state, as the business is treated as a single unit.
Under the unitary business principle, the activities of a subsidiary would
be reached, if it is unitary with its parent and the parent's activities created
nexus with the state.
54
1. The Reader's Digest Case
The only judicial authority cited in support of the extension of
the unitary business principle to a seller's obligation to collect use
tax is the Reader's Digest55 case. In that case The Reader's Digest
tate Tax Comm'n, "Imposition of the Duty to Collect Use Tax: Finding Sufficient Nexus
Over the Out-of-State Direct Market Seller," id. at 55.
51. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 345 (1954); National Bellas Hess, Inc.
v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967).
52. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
53. Hoiska, supra note 50, at 42 (citing Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Mahin, 44 I1. 2d 354,
255 N.E.2d 458, cert. denied 399 U.S. 919 (1970)).
54. Friedman, supra note 50, at 58-59.
55. Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Mahin, 44 Ill. 2d 354, 255 N.E.2d 458, cert. denied, 399
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Association (the plaintiff), which published the magazine Reader's
Digest, brought suit to enjoin the Illinois Director of Revenue from
requiring the plaintiff to collect use tax on sales to Illinois custom-
ers of books and phonograph albums marketed in the state.
The plaintiff was a Delaware corporation with no employees,
offices or other place of business, or real or tangible personal prop-
erty in Illinois. The plaintiff solicited orders for the sales of books
and albums to Illinois customers by direct mail and through news-
papers and radio and television stations located in Illinois. All or-
ders and payments for the books and albums were sent by the cus-
tomer by mail to the plaintiff's head office in New York. The
orders were accepted, and shipment of the goods was made from
other states by mail to the customer in Illinois.
The plaintiff owned all the stock of Reader's Digest Sales &
Services, Inc., which had solicited orders for sales of the plaintiff's
albums and phonograph records during earlier periods, but during
the taxable periods at issue, the subsidiary was engaged in Illinois
solely in the solicitation of advertising for plaintiff's magazine,
Reader's Digest. The plaintiff also owned all the stock of Reader's
Digest Services, Inc., which published the educational edition of
Reader's Digest, textbooks, and other educational materials. Like
the plaintiff's magazine Reader's Digest, sales of the educational
edition were exempt from Illinois use tax. A majority-owned sub-
sidiary of the plaintiff, Quality School Plan, Inc., also had nine
salesmen residing in Illinois, who solicited orders for the educa-
tional edition of Reader's Digest.
The Illinois use tax was required to be collected from the pur-
chaser of tangible personal property at retail by "a retailer main-
taining a place of business in this State." 6 The term "retailer
maintaining a place of business in this State" was defined as
follows:
Having or maintaining within this State, directly or by a subsidiary, an
office, distribution house, sales house, warehouse or other place of business,
or any agent or other representative, operating within this State under the
authority of the retailer or its subsidiary, irrespective of whether such place
of business or agent or other representative is located here permanently or
temporarily, or whether such retailer or subsidiary is licensed to do business
in this State.57
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judg-
U.S. 919 (1970).
56. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 439.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
57. Id. at § 439.2.
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ment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff's
constitutional presence requisite to the duty to collect use tax on
its sales of books and albums was established by the solicitation of
advertising for the plaintiff's magazine, Reader's Digest, by
Reader's Digest Sales & Services, Inc.
The plaintiff contended that the fact that its subsidiary acted
as its agent in soliciting advertising for its magazine did not estab-
lish its nexus with the state for its sales of books and albums, par-
ticularly since the sales of the magazine were exempt from use tax.
The court disagreed, holding that a taxpayer's activities in the
state may not be compartmentalized for purposes of determining
its obligation to collect use taxes. This holding, of course, antici-
pated the Supreme Court's decision in National Geographic Soci-
ety v. State Board of Equalization," in which the Court ruled that
the maintenance in California by National Geographic of offices
and employees who were engaged solely in soliciting advertising for
its magazine laid the jurisdictional basis for the state's requiring
the company to collect use tax on its mail order sales of maps, at-
lases, globes, and books to residents of the state.
5 9
The Reader's Digest case created no new or novel doctrine.
Except for foreshadowing the National Geographic case, it merely
applied well-established rules of agency to activities of a subsidiary
acting on behalf of its parent company.60 Consequently, the
Reader's Digest case provides no support for the view that the
mere existence of a unitary business relationship requires the attri-
bution, for sales or use tax collection purposes, to a parent com-
pany of its subsidiary's activities in the state.
2. Common Interrelationships of a Parent Company and Its
Subsidiaries in a Unitary Business Relied on to Establish
Parent's Nexus to State
Commissioner Hoiska did not confine her argument to the
novel proposition that the operations of a subsidiary may be at-
tributed, for nexus purposes, to the parent company merely by vir-
tue of the fact that the corporations are constituents of a unitary
business. She made that argument, but she also went on to make
the alternative contention that the interrelationships that typically
58. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
59. Id. at 562.
60. See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960). (Although plaintiff maintained no
office, and owned no property in Florida, it was responsible for the collection of use tax from
sales solicited by plaintiffs' agents in Florida)
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exist between a parent and its subsidiaries in a unitary enterprise
justify the piercing of the corporate veil so as to treat the subsidi-
aries as mere divisions of the parent and, in any event, assure that
the types of activities that are carried on by the parent and the
subsidiary in the state will frequently establish sufficient nexus to
enable the state to require the parent to collect the use tax.61
These are important caveats because of the practice in some
controlled groups for the parent company or its service company
subsidiary to perform many of the normal functions of operating
subsidiaries. The Reader's Digest case exemplifies the type of cor-
porate practice that may lead to the application of agency princi-
ples to establish nexus through the activities of an affiliate.
C. The Origins and Development of the Unitary Business
Doctrine
Returning to the Hoiska-MTC contention that the unitary
business doctrine per se without more affords a basis for attribut-
ing the activities in the state of a subsidiary to its parent company,
I should like to examine the origins and development of the uni-
tary business doctrine. The doctrine originated with the "unit
rule," as it was known in the last quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury. It was first used by the states for attributing portions of the
base of capital stock taxes and property taxes imposed on inter-
state railroads, express, telegraph, and similar companies that op-
erated in more than one state.62 The formulary approach was used
because it was found to be the only acceptable method of deter-
mining the value of the segment of an ongoing railroad business or
other multistate transportation business attributable to the state.
At the turn of the century, with the development of corporate
taxes measured by net income, the unit method, which now be-
came known as apportionment, was extended to mercantile, manu-
facturing, and other businesses carried on in more than one state.6 3
Challenges to the constitutionality of formulary apportion-
61. See Hoiska, supra note 50, at 44.
62. The history of the unit rule and the unitary business doctrine is traced in 1 J.
HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION, CORPORATE INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAXES % 8.5 (1983); see
also 2 J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY chs. XIX-XX (1937).
63. 1 J. HELLERSTEIN supra note 62 at 1 8.5. See also Gerstenberg, Report of Nat'l.
Tax Ass'n. Committee on Allocation of Business Income, 1931 Nat'l. Tax Ass'n. Proc. 301;
Report of Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the House
Committee on the Judiciary "State Taxation of Interstate Commerce," H.R. REP. No. 1480,
88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 168 (1964) (Willis Committee Report).
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ment dividing the income of a unitary multistate business among
the states in which the business is conducted have been rejected
consistently by the Supreme Court, from the Underwood Type-
writer64 case in 1920 to Container Corporation5 in 1983. Appor-
tionment has been sustained, as Justice Brandeis put the matter in
Underwood Typewriter, because of "the impossibility of allocating
specifically the profits ... earned by a series of transactions begin-
ning with manufacture in [the taxing state] and ending with sale in
other States."6 6 In a more recent Supreme Court opinion Justice
Marshall reaffirmed that view, noting, "'[W]here there are inte-
grated, interdependent steps in the economic process carried on by
a business enterprise, there is no logical or viable method for accu-
rately separating out the profit attributable to one step in the eco-
nomic process from other steps.' "167
As multicorporate unitary enterprises became more and more
prevalent in our economy, the application of the unitary method to
such interstate businesses took on added importance in reducing
the manipulation of state income taxes through intercompany pric-
ing and other tax avoidance arrangements. Combined reporting
was developed in order to determine the income attributable to a
state of a taxable corporation that was a constituent of a mul-
ticorporate-structured unitary business."8
No similar or comparable development has taken place with
respect to sales and use taxes because the reasons for the develop-
ment of the unitary doctrine in property and capital stock taxation
of multistate transportation businesses and in income taxation of
multistate mercantile, manufacturing, or other businesses do not
obtain with respect to sales and use taxes. Thus, a net income tax
on a multistate business is levied on the profits resulting from the
activities of the employees of the business in all states, the prop-
erty wherever located, and the operations of the entire business
wherever conducted during an entire taxable year. Sales and use
taxes are of an entirely different character. They are transaction
taxes, levied separately on each sale or each use of tangible per-
64. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
65. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
66. Underwood Typewriter, 254 U.S. at 120-21.
67. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 218 (1980) (quoting
HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LocAL TAXATION 400 (3rd ed. 1983)).
68. See Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business Con-
cept and Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAx L. REv. 171, 198 (1970); Keesling, A Current
Look at the Combined Report and Uniformity in Allocation Practices, 42 J. TAx'N 106
(1975).
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sonal property in the state. Unlike income taxes, which take into
account all the transactions that were engaged in and all property
owned or used over a taxable year, sale or use is taxed at the mo-
ment the transaction takes place.
Because of these fundamental differences in the nature of the
levies, the entire base of a sales or use tax, typically the sales price,
is taxed by only one state.69 Typically, the sale or use is taxed in
the state of destination of the sale, usually the purchaser's state,
and the entire measure of the tax is levied on by a single state,
without apportionment. 0 To be sure, in order to avoid double tax-
ation the states generally allow a credit against their use taxes for
sales taxes on the property paid to other states.7 1 Apportionment,
however, plays no role in sales or use taxation. There is, accord-
ingly, no warrant for attempting to carry over the alien unitary ap-
portionment doctrine to sales or use tax collection.
There is another fundamental reason why the unitary appor-
tionment principle should not be carried over to sales and use
taxes in determining the extent of a seller's obligation to collect
the tax. Commissioner Hoiska and the MTC are seeking to extend
the jurisdiction of the states to require the parent company of a
unitary business to collect the tax by reason of the subsidiary's ac-
tivities in the state. Apportionment is not designed to expand a
state's taxing jurisdiction. Indeed, taxpayers have long challenged
apportionment on that very ground, namely, that through formu-
lary apportionment the states are extending their jurisdiction to
tax extraterritorial income and extraterritorial values. In upholding
the constitutionality of apportionment, including combined report-
ing, the courts have consistently rejected the contention that ap-
portionment extends a state's taxing jurisdiction over income or
taxpayers. Instead, they have held that apportionment, including
combined reporting, serves only to determine in an equitable man-
ner the amount of income or other tax measure of a taxpayer that
is part of a unitary business that is properly attributable to the
state.72 Consequently, as a constitutional matter, the unitary busi-
ness doctrine that underlies apportionment affords no justification
69. See ST. & Loc. TAx SERV. All States Guide (P-H) 256 (Nov. 1985).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd., v. State Tax Comm. 266 U.S. 271 (1924);
Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue,
447 U.S. 207 (1980); Edison California Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16
(1947).
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for expanding the jurisdiction of a state to require a corporation to
collect use tax.
D. Statutory Basis for Extending the Unitary Business
Doctrine to Use Tax Collection
In addition to the constitutional infirmity of the Hoiska-MTC
view that the unitary business doctrine affords a basis for attribut-
ing a subsidiary's activities in a state to its parent for use tax
nexus purposes, there is also serious question as to whether there
is any statutory authority for the proposal. Commissioner Hoiska
relies on the Illinois statute that was at issue in Reader's Digest."s
As has been pointed out above, the Illinois statute provides that a
retailer maintaining a place of business in the state is required to
collect use tax. The relevant portion of the definition of such a
retailer includes the following: "[h]aving or maintaining within this
state, directly or by a subsidiary, an office, distribution house, sales
house, warehouse or other place of business, or any agent or other
representative operating within this State under the authority of
the retailer or its subsidiary."' The sales tax laws of a number of
other states, including California, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, and
Maryland, contain virtually identical provisions."
In Reader's Digest the court held that the plaintiff maintained
in the state a subsidiary that was acting as its agent by soliciting
orders for the magazine Reader's Digest. It was those activities of
the subsidiary as plaintiff's agent that justified the imposition on
the plaintiff of the duty to collect the use tax on its books and
record albums. There is nothing in the decision in Reader's Digest
dealing with the application of the unitary business doctrine to
nexus for use tax collection purposes.
The Illinois statute interpreted in Reader's Digest is loosely
drawn and ambiguous, and I am by no means clear that it will be
interpreted in the way Commissioner Hoiska and the MTC appar-
ently believe it should be, namely, as meaning that whenever a
subsidiary in a unitary business has a place of business or an em-
ployee or agent in the state, it follows ipso facto that the parent
company indirectly maintains the subsidiary's office or representa-
tive in the state. One can fairly read the provision more narrowly
73. See supra, note 56.
74. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 120 § 439.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
75. See CAL. REV. & TAx CODE § 6015.5 (West Supp. 1986); IowA CODE ANN. § 423.1(G)
(West 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3703(h) (1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.340(2) (Bobbs-
Merrill 1982).
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as meaning that if it is established by evidence that the subsidi-
ary's office is in fact an agency operating on behalf of the parent or
that the subsidiary's representative in fact conducts activities in
the state on behalf of the parent, the subsidiary's nexus in the
state will be attributed to the parent. If the statute is construed in
this way, it would neither support the Hoiska-MTC unitary busi-
ness attribution principle nor add anything to the traditional rules
of agency. That would mean, then, that the provision in question
amounts to little more than exhortation by the legislature to the
courts to apply traditional agency rules to the relations between a
subsidiary and its parent company.
It also should be noted that there are large gaps in this type of
statutory provision. First, it is a one way street between parent and
subsidiary. It attributes the subsidiary's office and representatives,
in the stated circumstances, to the parent company for nexus pur-
poses, but not the parent company's activities to the subsidiary.
Nor does the statute attribute the offices or representatives of sis-
ter companies in the state to each other.
These gaps in the provision may not have been due to faulty
draftsmanship, but instead to thoughtful consideration. Central-
ized control and management of the subsidiaries within an affili-
ated group, typically by the parent company, are essential charac-
teristics of a unitary business. Consequently, the draftsmen of the
provision may have felt free to proceed on the premise that such
control and management of the subsidiary results in the parent
company's "having or maintaining" an office or representative in
the state. On that thesis, the subsidiary's office and representatives
would establish the parent company's nexus for use tax collection
purposes. But since subsidiaries seldom control their parents or
sister companies, attribution of nexus activities of the parent com-
pany to its subsidiary or attribution of the activities of the sister
subsidiary to a company would be inappropriate.
There are many states whose sales tax laws contain no provi-
sion such as the Illinois provision attributing the activities of a
subsidiary to the parent company for sales or use tax collection
purposes. Arizona, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, and
New Jersey are among those states. 8
76. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-140 (1980); FAL. STAT. ANN. § 212.06 (West Supp.
1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1752(10) (1978); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 641, § 1
(West Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 144.665 (Vernon 1976). The Tennessee statute imposes
on every "dealer" making sales at retail, the duty to collect the tax. The term "dealer" is
defined to include a person who:
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E. The Proposed Federal Legislation Authorizing the States to
Require Out-of-State Mail Order Houses to Collect Use Tax
Professor Paul J. Hartman has charted elsewhere in this issue
of the Vanderbilt Law Review the metes and bounds of the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court dealing with the power of the states to
require out-of-state mail-order houses to collect use tax.77 Mail-or-
der selling is big business. A recent study by the ACIR established
that mail-order sales are running to an estimated 44.9 billion dol-
lars a year78 and that the states are losing badly-needed, poten-
tially taxable revenue running in excess of one billion dollars a
year.7 9
As a matter of fiscal policy, I know of no justification for fail-
ing to require out-of-state mail-order houses that exploit the mar-
kets of a state to collect the state's use tax on goods they sell and
ship to customers in the state. Besides, unless mail-order houses
are required to collect use tax, they have an unfair advantage over
local businesses that are required to collect the tax. 0 There is no
economic or fiscal justification for perpetuating that advantage.
Maintains or has within this state, directly or by a subsidiary, an office, distribut-
ing house, sales room, or house warehouse, or other place of business;
Has any representative, agent, salesman, canvasser or solicitor operating in this
state, or any person who serves in such capacity, for the purpose of making sales or the
taking of orders for sales, irrespective of whether such representative, agent, salesman,
canvasser or solicitor is located here permanently or temporarily, and irrespective of
whether an established place of business is maintained in this state.
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 67-6-102(4) (Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
At the time the issue of combined reporting first arose in a number of states, the stat-
utes did not explicitly provide for combined reporting of the income of a taxable corporation
that was a constituent of a unitary multicorporate enterprise. Nevertheless, the broad au-
thority granted to the tax administrator to provide methods of division of income that
would fairly reflect the taxpayer's activities in the state, its income derived from sources in
the state and the like, were relied on in some states to justify the use of the combined
reporting. See Edison California Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal.2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947);
Coca-Cola Co. v. Department of Revenue, 271 Ore. 517, 533 P.2d 788 (1975); contra Polaroid
Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 393 Mass. 490, 472 N.E.2d 259 (1984). There are no
comparable provisions, however, in sales or use tax statutes other than those discussed in
the text that can be read as authorizing tax administrators to attribute to the parent com-
pany of a unitary business activities of a subsidiary for sales or use tax collection purposes.
77. See Hartman, Collection of the Use Tax on Out-of-State Mail-Order Sales, 39
VAND. L. REv. 993 (1986).
78. "State and Local Taxation of Out-of-State Mail Order Sales," Advisory Comm'n
on Intergovernmental Affairs, 4, 6 (A-105, April, 1986).
79. Id. at 1-4. The estimates range from a "conservative" $667 million per year to a
"higher" estimate of $1.65 billion. The $1 billion figure is stated to be "well within the realm
of possibility." Id.
80. See the ACIR hearing on the report cited in supra note 78 held on March 8, 1985
in Washington, D.C. The proceedings have not been published.
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The ACIR has recommended that Congress enact legislation
authorizing the states to require out-of-state mail-order houses to
collect use tax.8 1 Under that proposal there would be a de minimis
exemption from sales tax collection granted to sellers whose vol-
ume of sales does not exceed a designated amount. In addition, the
states would be required to allow sellers who operate in more than
one state to elect to use a state rate only or a single, nondiscrimi-
natory combined state and local tax rate in collecting the tax. 2
1. The Constitutional Challenge to Federal Legislation
The constitutionality of such congressional legislation has
been challenged by mail-order houses. They argue that Congress
lacks the power to lift the barrier of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment by authorizing the states to require collec-
tion of use tax by mail-order houses and others that have been
found by the Supreme Court not to have sufficient nexus with the
state.8 3 This argument proceeds on the premise that the Supreme
Court's decision in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue8 was rested on both the commerce and due process
clauses. They concede, of course, that under its power to regulate
interstate commerce, Congress can lift the barrier of the commerce
clause to the states' requiring collection of the use tax, but not the
restrictions of the due process clause.88 I should like to discuss
those questions.
In National Bellas Hess the mail-order house contended that
the state's imposition of the obligation to collect use tax violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and imposed
an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce in violation of
the commerce clause. The Court said:
These two claims are closely related. For the test whether a particular state
exaction is such as to invade the exclusive authority of Congress to regulate
trade between the States, and the test for a state's compliance with the re-
81. The ACIR has endorsed the proposed legislation set out in the Preliminary Draft
of May 14, 1985. See supra note 78 ST. & Loc. TAX BULL. (P-H), 16.1 Oct. 15, 1985.
82. See supra notes 78, 81.
83. See supra note 81.
84. 386 U.S. 753 (1967). The case is treated extensively in Hartman, supra note 77.
85. It is well established that Congress has the power to remove or modify restrictions
imposed on the states by the self executing force of the commerce clause. Lewis v. BT In-
vestment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25
(1942); Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1914); Stern, The
Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HAnv. L. REv. 645 (1945); P.
HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LocAL TAXATION §2:1 (1981).
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quirements of due process in this area are similar. As to the former, the Court
has held that "State taxation falling on interstate commerce. . . can only be
justified as designed to make such commerce bear a fair share of the cost of
the local government whose protection it enjoys." And in determining
whether a state tax falls within the confines of the Due Process Clause, the
Court has said that the "simple but controlling question is whether the state
has given anything for which it can ask return." The same principles have
been held applicable in determining the power of a State to impose the bur-
dens of collecting use taxes upon interstate sales. Here, too, the Constitution
requires "some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and
the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax."'
In analyzing prior decisions, the Court cited the cases involv-
ing sellers who maintained retail stores or local agents who con-
ducted continuous solicitation in the taxing state. Such sellers, it
declared, have been required to collect the use tax. "But the Court
has never held that a State may impose the duty of use tax collec-
tion and payment upon a seller whose only connection with cus-
tomers in the State is by common carrier or the United States
mail.187
Accordingly, the Court held that the purchaser's state could
not require National Bellas Hess to collect the tax. In so doing, the
Court rested its decision squarely on the commerce clause, saying:
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of commercial transactions more exclusively
interstate in character than the mail order transactions here involved. And if
the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon National were upheld,
the resulting impediments upon the free conduct of its interstate business
would be neither imaginary nor remote. For if Illinois can impose such bur-
dens, so can every other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every
school district, and every other political subdivision throughout the Nation
with power to impose sales and use taxes. The many variations in rates of
tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and recordkeeping re-
quirements could entangle National's interstate business in a virtual welter of
complicated obligations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to im-
pose "a fair share of the cost of the local government." 8
Nowhere in the opinion is there a finding or a conclusion that
National had failed to satisfy the requirement of a minimum nexus
with the state. Instead, the rationale and basis of the decision were
that the imposition of a duty to collect the tax put undue burdens
on the seller. The Court's language--"impediments upon the free
conduct of . . . interstate business" and "burdens" on the com-
merce that could "entangle National's interstate business in a vir-
tual welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdictions"-was
86. 386 U.S. at 756 (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 758.
88. Id. at 756-60 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 39:961
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS
commerce clause language.
Consequently, National Bellas Hess is not, in my opinion, au-
thority for the proposition that the company lacked the "definite
link . . . [the] minimum connection" with the purchaser's state
that is requisite to a state's constitutional power to require the
seller to collect its use tax.
Nor is the decision authority for the proposition that the im-
position of such an obligation on the mail-order house violated the
due process clause. As I read National Bellas Hess, it holds that
the duty to collect the tax imposed on the mail-order house consti-
tuted an undue burden on interstate commerce in violation of the
commerce clause. This view of the decision is fortified by the last
paragraph of the opinion, in which the Court stated: "The very
purpose of the Commerce Clause was to ensure a national economy
free from such unjustifiable local entanglements. Under the Con-
stitution, this is a domain where Congress alone has the power of
regulation and control."8
Not only did the Court thus make clear that it was setting
aside the state's imposition on the mail-order house of the duty to
collect the tax under the commerce clause, but it also went out of
its way to indicate that Congress could modify the decision since
"this is a domain where Congress alone has the power of regulation
and control." 90
Accordingly, National Bellas Hess does not appear to me to
bar federal legislation empowering the states to require mail-order
houses that deliver goods across state lines to local purchasers to
collect and pay over the state's use tax.9 1
Reading the Supreme Court's mind is a hazardous business,
however, and my reading may prove to be in error. Hence, I should
like to go on and consider the matter under the view of National
89. Id. at 760.
90. Id.
91. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954), was another interstate use tax
collection case, in which the out-of-state seller's duty to collect was invalidated. That case
involved purchases at a Wilmington, Delaware department store that were delivered to the
customers in Maryland. Maryland sought to require the department store to collect the use
tax. The taxpayer also relied on both the due process and the commerce clauses. By way of
contrast with National Bellas Hess, the Court explicitly rested its decision on the due pro-
cess clause. It declared that it was not required to consider "whether the statute imposes an
unjustifiable burden upon interstate commerce." 347 U.S. at 347. The Court stated in Na-
tional Bellas Hess that it "need not rest on the broad foundation on all that was said in the
Miller Bros. opinion, for here there was neither local advertising nor local household deliv-
eries, upon which the dissenters in Miller Bros. so largely relied." National Bellas Hess, 386
U.S. at 759.
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Bellas Hess taken by the mail-order houses, that the case was de-
cided under both the due process and commerce clauses. In that
event, the question arises as to whether Congress has the power to
set aside the restrictions of the due process clause on the states'
requiring collection of use tax by mail-order houses.
2. The .Authority of Congress Under the Enforcement Provision
of the Fourteenth Amendment to Set Aside the Due Process
Clause Restrictions on the Power of the States to Require Out-
of-State Mail-Order Houses to Collect Use Tax on Goods
Delivered to Purchasers in the State
Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, which, of course, ap-
plied the due process clause to the states, provides: "The Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article.
92
In Katzenbach v. Morgans a leading case interpreting the
power of Congress under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment,
the Court upheld the power of Congress to broaden the restrictions
on the states imposed by the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.94 The Federal Voting Rights Act provided that
no person who had successfully completed the sixth grade in a Pu-
erto Rican school in which the instruction was not in English could
be denied the right to vote because of an inability to read or write
English. A New York statute denied voting to such persons. The
state contended that its statute, which required literacy in English
as a voting requirement, did not violate the equal protection clause
and that Congress was powerless to broaden the restrictions of the
clause. The Court disagreed as to the congressional power under
the enforcement provision, saying:
By including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific
provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers
expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause. The classic formulation of the
reach of those powers was established by Chief Justice Marshall in McCul-
loch v. Maryland:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the con-
stitution, are constitutional" 95
In other decisions of the Court, the principle enunciated in
92. U.S. CONsT. amend XIV, § 5.
93. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
94. Id. Accord South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
95. 384 U.S. at 650 (citations and footnote omitted).
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Katzenbach has been relied on to sustain the power of Congress to
expand the scope of other civil rights provided by the equal protec-
tion clause. Thus, the Court upheld the power of Congress to lower
the age of voters in national elections to eighteen and to limit state
residency requirements for voting,96 but it denied the power of
Congress to enfranchise eighteen year olds in state and local
elections.97
In a decision handed down in 1982, the Court considered the
other side of the coin: whether Congress has the power, by reason
of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, to narrow the protec-
tions against gender discrimination granted by the equal protec-
tion clause.9 In that case, Joe Hogan, a registered nurse who did
not hold a baccalaureate degree in nursing, was denied admission
to a state nursing school solely because of his sex. Hogan brought
suit on the ground that the single sex admissions policy of the
nursing school violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
The state relied on the provision of Title IX of the Education
Amendments Act of 1972 that expressly exempted from the prohi-
bition of gender discrimination state undergraduate institutions
that traditionally had used single sex admissions policies.9 9 Thus,
the state argued, Congress had limited the reach of the fourteenth
amendment by the exercise of its power under section 5. The Court
disagreed. With respect to the power of Congress under section 5
of the fourteenth amendment, the Court said in an opinion by Jus-
tice O'Connor:
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress broad power in-
deed to enforce the command of the Amendment and "to secure to all per-
sons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection
of the laws against State denial or invasion. .... "
Congress' power under § 5, however, "is limited to adopting measures to
enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to
restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees." Katzenbach v. Rubin... Al-
though we give deference to congressional decisions and classifications,
neither Congress nor a State can validate a law that denies the rights guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment.100
The law is thus established that Congress has the power,
under section 5, to broaden the protections of civil rights and
96. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
97. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
98. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
99. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(5) (1982).
100. 458 U.S. at 732-33 (citations omitted).
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equality of treatment granted to individuals under the equal pro-
tection clause, but that it has no power to undercut or dilute such
rights.
These cases, which deal with the civil rights guaranteed by the
Civil War amendments to the Constitution, arose under the equal
protection clause. There is, however, no Supreme Court decision
dealing with the question whether Congress, in regulating inter-
state commerce, has the power to broaden the taxing powers of the
states as otherwise restricted by the due process clause. There is,
however, a dictum by Justice O'Connor in a dissenting opinion
that suggests that Congress may possess no such power. In
ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission °1 the Court invali-
dated, under the due process clause, an apportioned income tax on
dividends paid by a corporation that was found not to be a part of
the recipient taxpayer's unitary business. Justice O'Connor, in dis-
sent, stated that "unlike a Commerce Clause ruling which is sus-
ceptible to repair by Congress, today's due process decision may be
beyond Congress' power to correct. '10 2 The Justice cited no au-
thority to support her assertion.103
The mail-order sales tax collection issue is of a very different
genre from the voting rights, gender discrimination, and other civil
rights issues involved in the decisions in which the Court has taken
the position that Congress does not have the power to narrow the
constitutional restraints of the fourteenth amendment. The use tax
collection issue arises under the due process clause, not the equal
protection clause. The controversy relates not to civil rights, but to
the power of the federal government under our federalist structure
to regulate the national economy.
Because Congress may not narrow the protections to civil
rights guaranteed by the equal protection clause or the due process
clause, it does not follow that Congress may not enlarge the power
of the states, as restricted by the due process clause, to tax or im-
pose a tax collection obligation on interstate business. Safeguard-
ing state tax revenues against evasion by transactions in interstate
101. 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
102. Id. at 350 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
103. In an analysis of the cases dealing with the power of Congress to interpret the
due process and equal protection clauses, Professor William Cohen of Stanford Law School
concluded: "In only one class of cases-involving protection of civil rights under section 5 of
the 14th amendment-has the doctrine of dual federalism re-emerged as a potential limit on
the powers of Congress." Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal
Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603, 604 (1975).
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commerce presents a very different set of problems and may ap-
propriately require a different interpretation of the power of Con-
gress to restrict rights otherwise protected by the due process
clause than as the guarantees of civil rights and freedom from dis-
crimination are protected by the fourteenth amendment. 04
There are several cogent reasons for interpreting section 5, the
enforcement provision of the fourteenth amendment, so as to rec-
ognize the power of Congress to broaden the tax enforcement pow-
ers of the states over interstate commerce under the due process
clause.
First, the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, insofar as it
relates to civil rights, was "to secure to all persons the enjoyment
of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the
laws against State denial or invasion."' ° Consequently, the protec-
tions guaranteed by the amendment may not be watered down by
congressional legislation under section 5.
The due process limitations on state taxation imposed by the
amendment have a very different purpose. Insofar as is relevant to
the proposed mail-order use tax legislation, the due process clause
prohibits extraterritorial taxation by the states.0 6 As such, it is one
of the constitutional pillars of our federalist structure, along with
the commerce clause and the equal protection clause (as well as
the privileges and immunities clause).0 7 As stated by Justice Bren-
nan in Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers: 0 8
I think that the answer lies in remembering that our Constitution is an
instrument of federalism. The Constitution furnishes the structure for the
operation of the States with respect to the National Government and with
104. Compare the Supreme Court's differing approaches to the commerce clause, in
cases involving federal regulation, as distinguished from state taxation. In Stafford v. Wal-
lace, 258 U.S. 495, 515-16 (1922), the Court sustained the power of Congress to regulate
state stockyards, because the "stockyards are not a place of rest or final destination" of the
livestock that arrives daily. They are "but a throat through which the current flows" from
West to East. Id. On the other hand, in Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933), the Court
sustained the power of a state to apply its property tax to cattle that were being held in
stockyards, even though the cattle had been shipped from other states and were being held
for transshipment out of state. The Court stated that "the cattle ... were not in transit
* . , they had come to rest." Blasius, 290 U.S. at 12. Consequently, it was held that the
commerce clause provided no "immunity from the tax" for the cattle. Id.
105. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879); see Mississippi University for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 732.
106. See P. HARTMAN, supra note 85, T 2.3.
107. The privileges and immunities clause has only a limited role in the area of state
taxation of interstate business because it has been held inapplicable to corporations. See
Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907).
108. 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
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respect to each other. The maintenance of the principles of federalism is a
foremost consideration in interpreting any of the pertinent constitutional
provisions under which this Court examines state action. Because there are
49 States and much of the Nation's commercial activity is carried on by en-
terprises having contacts with more States than one, a common and continu-
ing problem of constitutional interpretation has been that of adjusting the
demands of individual States to regulate and tax these enterprises in light of
the multistate nature of our federation. While the most ready examples of the
Court's function in this field are furnished by the innumerable cases in which
the Court has examined state taxation and regulation under the Commerce
and Due Process Clauses, still the Equal Protection Clause, among its other
roles, operates to maintain this principle of federalism. 10 9
Second, the power of the federal government to regulate com-
merce is plenary. Thus, in sustaining the power of Congress to set
aside commerce clause restrictions on state taxation on out-of-state
insurance companies, the Supreme Court stated that the "plenary
scope" of the grant to Congress of the power to regulate interstate
commerce
enables Congress not only to promote but also to prohibit interstate com-
merce, as it has done frequently and for a great variety of reasons. That
power does not run down a one-way street or one of narrowly fixed dimen-
sions. Congress may keep the way open, confine it broadly or closely, or close
it entirely, subject only to the restrictions placed upon its authority by other
constitutional provisions and the requirement that it shall not invade the do-
mains of action reserved exclusively for the states.110
Moreover, as the Supreme Court has often reminded us with
respect to state taxation of interstate commerce, Congress stands
as the arbiter of the competing interests of the states, interstate
business, and local businesses. In Moorman Manufacturing Co. v.
Bair"" the Court stated:
It is clear that the legislative power granted to Congress by the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution would amply justify the enactment of legislation
requiring all States to adhere to uniform rules for the division of income. It is
to that body, and not this Court, that the Constitution has committed such
policy decisions.11
2
Moreover, in the National Bellas Hess case itself the Court stated:
"This is a domain where Congress alone has the power of regula-
tion and control."'13
Although I am by no means suggesting that Congress is free
and untrammelled by the commerce clause from the restrictive
109. Id. at 532.
110. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946) (footnotes
omitted).
111. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
112. Id. at 280.
113. 386 U.S. at 760.
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provisions of the Constitution, I am suggesting that the underpin-
ning of the broad power of Congress to regulate commerce is rele-
vant to the question whether Congress can free the states from re-
strictions imposed by the due process clause in regulating state
taxation of interstate commerce.
From that vantage point, the proposed legislation should be
sustained, even if the Supreme Court should regard National Bel-
las Hess as having been decided on due process, as well as on com-
merce clause, grounds. For unless Congress possesses such power,
the Nation is paralyzed to take such actions as requiring out-of-
state mail-order houses to collect use tax without an amendment
to the Constitution of the United States. Such an issue hardly rises
to the level of importance that should necessitate constitutional
amendment.
In reaching this conclusion, it is important to put the pro-
posed legislation into proper perspective. It does not affect the tax-
ability of any purchaser. State use tax laws require the purchaser
to pay the tax on goods ordered from out-of-state mail-order
houses if a tax has not been collected by the seller. Because most
purchasers of mail-order goods fall to pay the tax, if the tax is not
collected by the seller, it is unlikely to be paid. The purposes of
the proposed legislation are to reduce tax evasion and to eliminate
the competitive advantage of out-of-state mail-order houses over
local business.
Furthermore, it is to be noted that the mail-order house is not
the taxpayer, at least not in the normal sense of that term. Under
most state statutes, the use tax is required to be paid by the pur-
chaser, not the seller. The mail-order house can properly complain
only of the asserted burdens imposed on it by the necessity of col-
lecting the tax. By enacting the proposed legislation, Congress
would be determining that the accommodation of the competing
interests of the states for revenue and of the local merchant in be-
ing freed of the disadvantage of competing against a mail-order
house that is not required to collect use tax outweigh the interest
of mail-order houses in avoiding the burdens of tax collection.
Congress also would be determining that the "definite link," the
"minimum connection," between the mail-order house that is ex-
ploiting a state's market and the taxing state are sufficient, in light
of both the commerce and the due process clauses, to justify im-
posing on the seller a duty to collect use tax on goods shipped into
the state. Such findings by Congress would, in my view, be likely to
go very far, indeed, toward persuading the Court that the congres-
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sional legislation empowering the states to require out-of-state
mail-order houses to collect the use tax on goods shipped to pur-
chasers in the state is well within the power of Congress under our
federalist system.114
I simply do not believe that the Supreme Court will hold that
the framers of the Constitution and the fourteenth amendment left
this nation powerless, short of a constitutional amendment, to pre-
vent the evasion of use taxes on interstate sales and to eliminate
the tax advantage over local merchants enjoyed by out-of-state
mail-order houses by requiring mail-order houses to collect use tax
on delivery of goods to purchasers in a taxing state, despite the
joint exercise by Congress and the states of their respective regula-
tory and taxing powers under the Constitution.
114. A somewhat similar view of the interrelation of the due process clause and the
commerce clause is taken by Professor Cohen of Stanford University Law School. Professor
Cohen has written:
In the area of state taxation of interstate business, the more recent cases have replaced
the commerce clause with the due process clause as the primary limit on state taxing
power. Congress might roll back such due process decisions of the Court in recognizing,
for example, increased state taxing power or a larger territorial scope of state court
jurisdiciton. These congressional decisions would not be a dilution of liberty, but sim-
ply a rearrangement of power within the federal system.
Cohen, supra note 103, at 615-16 (footnotes omitted).
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